THE Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the main opposition political party in Zimbabwe, is characterised by theoretical and practical weaknesses.

It has not waged a decisive war against these weaknesses in its struggle for state political power. It is characterised by a profound failure to understand and recognise the importance of the primacy of internal factors over the external factors either in the resolution or the maintenance of Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic problems.

Its theoretical and practical weaknesses serve as its lessons in its struggle for state political power. To do justice to its struggle for political power, it must wage a decisive war against these weaknesses. These weaknesses are key challenges it is facing in its struggle to defeat the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU - PF).

The MDC does not in practice do justice to its position that the ruling party has been using violent or repressive measures and manipulating and rigging elections so as to win them. The fact that it has been maintaining this position is such that if it is sincere in maintaining it and wanted to do justice to it in practice, it should have decided and implemented decision to go beyond its parliamentary opposition tactics or electoral, constitutional route.

One of the key questions is whether it has ever raised the question as to whether it was possible for the ruling party to use violent or repressive measures and manipulate and rig elections so as to win them. Related to this question is another key question as to whether if it was convinced that it was possible or obvious that the ruling party was going to use violence, repression particularly against itself and manipulate and rig elections so as to win them what was its proposed programme of action against these measures.

Our work focuses on the MDC's profound failure to understand and recognise the importance of the primacy of internal factors over the external factors in the resolution of Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic problems. Directly related to this failure, is the fact that the MDC has not recognised in theory and practice the strategic importance of mobilising for political, economic and ideological hegemony and has been unable to provide comprehensive theoretical and practical alternatives to the ruling party as prerequisites to the realisation of its objective to be the ruling party. It has refused to fundamentally transform itself to serve as the social agent for change.

This work excludes the MDC faction led by Professor Arthur Mutambara. Mutambara and Morgan Tsvangirai have not yet effectively articulated political and policy programmes which constitute the qualitative leap forward in the struggle for the resolution of Zimbabwe's problems. They have not yet answered the question as to what is to be done in formulating, adopting and implementing the appropriate tactics for achieving state political power so as to effect socio-political and economic change. They have not yet convinced the masses of the people of Zimbabwe that theirs is the realisation of changes in power relations in socio-political, economic and institutional terrains and in the material and non-material aspects of their individual and collective life conditions. Tsvangirai still defends the MDC's Restart: Our Path to Social Justice, the economic programme for Reconstruction, Stabilisation, Recovery and Transformation, which is not theoretically exciting and which cannot be regarded by the considerable number of the people of Zimbabwe as their proud theoretical and ideological national product in their struggle for the resolution of their problems.

The MDC is the historical child of Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic problems. It has proved that it is incapable of solving these problems which were responsible for its coming into existence. Zimbabwe adopted and implemented the structural adjustment programme in the 1990s. It substantially reversed its socio-economic achievements made since political independence. The structural adjustment programme required the state to, among others, reduce the seize of the civil service, subsidies to parastatals and social and economic services. The state directed its priorities at trade liberalisation, export promotion, privatization of many of its assets and investment promotion.

The MDC became the beneficiary of these socio-economic problems in the 1990s and the early 2000s, demands by popular social forces and organisations for the state to solve them and the failure by the state to solve them. They are some of the key reasons behind its achievements in the 2000 and 2002 elections. Its achievements in these elections have been substantially reversed. They have not been consolidated since the 2002 presidential elections. Since 2003 the MDC failed to prove that it is politically capable of solving Zimbabwe's socio-economic problems. It has failed to prove that it is capable to provide the alternative political administrative of the society. As this work demonstrates it has refused to accept strategic advice it has been provided with.

Munyaradzi Gwisai, its former Member of Parliament, and his colleagues provided it with the strategic advice in 2001. Gwisai maintains that leaders of the International Socialist Organisation in 2001 told the MDC leaders that "unless they immediately changed their strategy of opposing the land reform programme and hanging on the aprons of white farmers, capitalists, the West and the International Monetary Fund and instead adopt anti-neo-liberal anti-imperialist stance they would be buried in future elections even without violence."3 The MDC has refused to accept this strategic advice and accordingly formulate and implement appropriate tactics.

The MDC lacks viable or progressive strategy and tactics and programme of action promoting and advancing popular national demands. It has refused to learn a lesson provided by both reactionary and revolutionary forces throughout the world. This lesson is the primacy of internal factors over external factors in any political, economic and ideological struggle. This reality means that the responsibility either to solve or to maintain socio-political and economic problems in any particular country lies internally within it, not externally outside it. This means that it lies on the shoulders of its people, not on the shoulders of the people of other countries.

The MDC has been advised by a considerable number of individuals and organisations, including its supporters, internally in Zimbabwe and externally. This advice has been offered to the MDC through criticism of its theoretical and practical weaknesses. It rejected this advice and, in the process, refused to wage a decisive war against these weaknesses in its struggle for state political power.

Barney Mthombothi maintains the position that the MDC has not yet learned this lesson or the primacy of internal factors over external factors either in the resolution or in the maintenance of socio-political and economic problems. He maintains this position in his article on why "Mugabe still wields power."6 He maintains that Tsvangirai's "diplomatic shuttle" across Southern Africa in the late 2004 was "a waste of time." His point is that there was "nothing he said in person to the leaders" of Southern Africa that "could not have been relayed down a telephone line" and that "the trip" was "more about Tsvangirai - an attempt at enhancing his status, his own stature - than enlightening people on the current situation in Zimbabwe."

The importance of the trip is that it exposed or highlighted "the shortcomings of the struggle" led by the MDC against the ruling party. Instead of mobilising its supporters, the MDC "has been wasting time on fervent pleas to the international community." Tsvangirai and his colleagues should recognise the reality in practice that the masses of the people of Zimbabwe are "the fount of their credibility, legitimacy, power and authority" and that when "the masses are properly mobilised no autocrat, no matter how powerful or repressive, can rule them against their will for any length of time." He concludes that the MDC's "tactic so far has been to appeal for international assistance in the form of sanctions and boycotts without a concomitant intensive mobilisation of the masses within the country" and that this tactic is incorrect in that it fails to come to grips with the reality that the "home front is the theatre, the crucible, of the struggle" or that the "engine of the opposition is in Zimbabwe, not outside"7 the country.

Quoting Pius Wakatama that "as a people's movement, the MDC should forget the orthodox niceties of professional political conduct with its feigned diplomacy, tactics, gimmicks and meaningless political correctness" and that its "actions should only be shaped in response to the cries of those in bondage,"14 Zvakwana Sokwanele in its 20 April 2005 message to the MDC leadership, maintained that the MDC should have embarked upon a programme of action which includes the use of mass actions, especially strikes against the state, the massive mobilisation of the civil society organisations, especially the churches to defy the ruling party prohibitions, the staging of peaceful protests to greatly embarrass the government at international and national high profile forums, the use of targeted boycotts of goods and services provided by leaders of the ruling party, and the exposure of those who have enormously benefited from Mugabe's personal patronage, and at expense of the people.15 The MDC has not embarked upon the programme of action which includes these activities.

The MDC has refused to adapt. It has failed to adequately respond to the ruling party's view of Zimbabwe's problems. The ruling party views Zimbabwe's problems from the national level to the regional and continental levels as the Pan-African struggle against imperialist domination and exploitation. It has so far not recognised the fundamental need to have a viable, progressive national, regional, continental and international strategy and tactics. Despite the fact that it is the political party in the former settler colonial country, it has not yet articulated a clear position on race relations, North-South relations, redistribution of resources and the continental and international pan-African agenda. These are some of the key issues which should be addressed clearly by the serious opposition party in its struggle for state political power in a former settler colony such as Zimbabwe.

Critics of the ruling party including some MDC members maintain that Morgan Tsvangirai does not have the intellectual capacity to lead effective opposition party particularly given the fact that it is challenging hegemonic party which has been in power since 1980 and whose intellectuals have been providing it with enormous intellectual capacity and resources in its struggle for continued exercise of state political power. They maintain that he is no match for Robert Mugabe in terms of intellectual capacity and inspiring members and supporters of their respective political parties. The point is that he is not a shrewd leader. He lacks "a degree of political imagination and ruthlessness."18 Africa Confidential has been consistent in highlighting Tsvangirai's profound lack of shrewd leadership qualities. In 2000 Tsvangirai made a crucial political mistake when he allowed international media to record white farmers handing over cheques to him. These were the same farmers who were practically against the national liberation struggle. The film made him appear either hungry for money or "naïve." Mugabe's advisors used the incident in a propaganda war that presented the MDC is the servant of the white minority and Britain.19 Tsvangirai's association with these farmers, many of them soldiers of the Rhodesian army which fought against national liberation struggle, isolated him from progressive people nationally and internationally.20 Africa Confidential and Newton Kanhema, Zimbabwean journalist, agree that Tsvangirai profoundly lacks shrewd leadership qualities.

The MDC inherited the position that solution to Zimbabwe's problems lies on the shoulders of leaders of African countries, not on the people of Zimbabwe from developed countries. Developed countries and their supporters regarded the need for political reform as a solution to what they regarded as the problem. President Mugabe was viewed as the problem to this solution. This proposed solution to Zimbabwe's problems was best and briefly articulated in their "Mugabe must go" demand. They hoped that Tsvangirai would defeat Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections. Mugabe defeated Tsvangirai in the elections. They regarded elections not as free and fair and the Zimbabwean government as illegitimate. They embarked upon various programmes of action to isolate the Zimbabwean government throughout the world.

They regard Mugabe as authoritarian, corrupt and dictator who has been stealing elections since the MDC posed a challenge to his rule in the 2000 elections. Mugabe is regarded as a threat to the socio-political and economic development and progress not only of his country and the Southern African region, but also of the whole African continent as well as Africa's initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Leaders of developed countries have been exerting pressure upon leaders of Southern African countries to join them in condemning Mugabe. They have been demanding that South Africa must play a leading role in acting against Mugabe for what they regard as his violations of human rights in Zimbabwe. Robert Rotberg's article, "Dictatorship and Decay: Only Mbeki can rescue Zimbabwe"22 is the most advanced representative of the position that the solution to Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic problems including the issue of removing Mugabe from power is the responsibility of President Mbeki and other African leaders, not the people of Zimbabwe. One of the key issues central to this view is the profound failure to view the Zimbabwean situation beyond Mugabe. This view has helped to marginalise the MDC in its efforts to provide the solution to Zimbabwea's problems. These are key issues charactering the MDC's "Mugabe must go" strategy.

The responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the people of Zimbabwe, not with the leaders of African countries. This is contrary to the position of the MDC that this responsibility lies with the leaders of African countries. This position is maintained by its supporters internally in Zimbabwe and externally outside Zimbabwe. It is interesting to note that it does not maintain that this responsibility lies also with leaders of developed countries. This reality is supportive of the position that this incorrect position is a means of leaders of developed countries to use African countries particularly South Africa to play a leading role to achieve their objective in Zimbabwe.

Did the MDC, through its theoretical and practical weaknesses, not help to "legitimise Mugabe" and "give Mugabe space to consolidate his position?"

Tsvangirai's harsh criticism of President Mbeki and President Obasanjo is reflection of his incorrect position that the responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the leaders of African countries, not with the people of Zimbabwe. In his speech to the MDC Members of Parliament in Harare on 18 December 2002, he maintained that President Mbeki had "embarked on an international safari to campaign for Mugabe's regime. Pretoria is free to pursue its agenda. But it must realise that Zimbabweans can never be fooled anymore."31 The relevant question is whether or not Tsvangirai ever realised that "Zimbabweans can never be fooled" by his profound lack of shrewd political qualities, his failure in leading the MDC to provide viable theoretical and practical positions, policies and programme of action which constitute the alternative to the ruling party and his fundamental weaknesses in articulating Zimbabwe's national socio-political and economic issues and taking strategic and tactical decisions in the interest of the MDC's struggle for power.

The MDC's incorrect position that the responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the leaders of African countries, not with the people of Zimbabwe under its leadership is its misunderstanding of the importance of the primacy of internal factors over external factors either in the resolution or the maintenance of internal problems of a given country.

The relationship between Zimbabwe and developed countries particularly Britain is primarily not the external process. It is primarily the internal, national process. Zimbabwe's current national situation should be approached by taking into consideration primarily dynamics of its specific internal movement which determines it. The international, external situation in which its specific movement takes place is a general, universal condition. It is not a particular condition. Factors within Zimbabwe determine the consequences of the international situation upon its national, internal situation. Discussion and explanation of the relationship between Zimbabwe and developed countries for their concrete understanding should be executed and achieved on the basis of a profound, dialectical, concrete historical and class analysis of Zimbabwe's specific or particular national situation without losing sight of what is taking place throughout the world particularly within international capitalism.

The content of the relationship which developed countries established and maintain with Zimbabwe is the process which is, internally and externally, condensed materially in its state. Is the post-settler colonial Zimbabwean state, material condensation of the struggle between labour and capital, the material condensation of the process of exploitation of the masses of the people by the forces of exploitation or of the process of liberation of the masses of the people? Is it maintaining exploitation or helping to end it? Is it reconciling contradictions between the forces of capital for the defence of their strategic interests or is it reconciling contradictions among the masses of the people for the achievement of their strategic interests?

The point is that underlying the process of economic transformation are the key questions concerning the exercise of the state political power: which social class or class alliance exercises the state political power in the country, by what tactical means and to what strategic ends? How is the exercise of the state political power, its means and ends, supported and contested by other social forces in the society? The fact that the masses of the Zimbabwean people are experiencing socio-economic problems is primarily the result of the national socio-political and economic policies pursued by the state of Zimbabwe. It is not primarily because of the relationship of Zimbabwe's economy with the international capitalist economic system. The issue of managing this relationship in Zimbabwe to effectively generate and distribute its benefits among the people of Zimbabwe depends on the state's practical commitment to the popular demands and interests and the balance of forces among those controlling the state on the satisfaction of the needs, demands and exigencies of Zimbabwe's national socio-political and economic relations.

The practical implementation of the theoretical understanding of the importance of the primacy of internal factors over external factors is of crucial importance to either resolution or maintenance of relations of socio-political and economic problems in Zimbabwe including inequalities, domination and exploitation, which developed countries established and maintain with Zimbabwe. It is through the process of confronting and resolving internal relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe that relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries will be resolved. Relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries cannot be resolved without resolving internal relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe.

The fundamental resolution of social relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe is the prerequisite means for the fundamental resolution of relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries. Relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe facilitate the defence and expansion of relations of inequalities, domination and exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries. This is the key central issue essential to the realisation of the qualitative, fundamental socio-political, ideological and economic transformation of Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is challenging the position of Oxfam in its Make Trade Fair Campaign that the "future of Africa, more than that of any other continent, hinges on the collective global action" and that the "ways in which Africa trades, receives aid and debt relief and governs itself is not the responsibility of Africans alone; these issues are the responsibility of decision-makers and global citizens everywhere."37 This position is supportive of the reality not only that the political economy of Africa is the most open, penetrated, dependent and dominated formation, but also that the African continent and its people are viewed as objects of compassion and contempt by some individuals throughout the world.

Our work has provided analysis of the theoretical and practical weaknesses of the MDC and its failure to understand and recognise the importance of the primacy of internal factors over the external factors in the resolution of Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic problems.

The MDC has not addressed itself seriously and effectively to the issue of power relations in Zimbabwe and the fundamental need to change them in favour of the interests of the vast majority of the people of Zimbabwe. It has not seriously, in theory and practice, recognised the importance of organising or mobilising the people to achieve political, economic and ideological hegemony as prerequisite not only for removal of those controlling the state from political power, but also for establishing alternative socio-political and economic order.

Central to the fundamental and structural need for the MDC to fundamentally transform itself is the reality that it must strive to have credible policies which are alternatives to those of the ruling party and of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It must also have programmes of action cable of responding to socio-political and economic challenges in Zimbabwe. It should also have a concrete understanding of socio-political and economic developments and debates in other countries particularly Southern African regional and African continental countries and view them progressively within the context of Pan-African agenda of resolving Africa's problems.

In other words, it should implement understanding that for the political party or a movement to effectively mobilize the people, generate a viable alternative agenda, and develop a capacity to establish a responsible, democratic, and accountable government on coming to power, it must have certain qualities: effective and flexible organization; ability to generate resources for its operations; a viable alternative program for overall reconstruction and rehabilitation; an effective foreign policy; legitimate and visionary leadership; a strong internal and public education program to challenge the established world view; a transparently democratic and accountable structure; and in-depth knowledge of existing political (even theoretical) debates, blueprints, developments in other nations, and of the local political economy.

2 Stefan Andreasson, "Economic Reform and ‘Virtual Democracy' in South Africa and Zimbabwe: The Incompatibility of Liberalisation, Inclusion and Development," Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 393-7, Suzanne Dansereau, "Liberation and Opposition in Zimbabwe," Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May 2003), pp. 181-5, and Lloyd Sachikonye, "The Year of Zimbabwe's political watershed," Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (December-January 2000-2001), p. 7.

3 Munyaradzi Gwisai, interviewed in Alternative Information and Development Centre, "Zimbabwe after the 2005 Parliamentary Elections," Alternatives, Vol. 3, No. 14 (April-May 2005), p. 8.

4 Suzanne Dansereau, ‘'Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Zimbabwe's Development Impasse,'' in Henning Melber (editor), Zimbabwe - The Political Economy of Decline (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2005), p. 23.

8 Alex T. Magaisa, "The pitfalls of opposition politics in Zimbabwe," newzimbabwe.com, 8 August 2005 (http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/thirdforce11.12923.html), pp. 1-2.

14 Pius Wakatama, quoted in Sokwanele: Civic Action Support (http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005), p. 2.

15 Sokwanele: Civic Action Support Group, "A Message to the MDC Leadership,"(http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005), p. 2.

17 International Crisis Group, Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next? Africa Report No. 93 (7 June 2005), p. 3. This report is available on the International Crisis Group website: http://www.crisisgroup.org.

23 Roger Bate, ‘'Zimbabwe's Impending Elections - What Other Countries Can Do, and Why,'' Movement for Democratic Change Online, 2 March 2005 (http://www.mdczimbabwe.org/Archives/2005/march/zimimpendingelec.htm, p.1.

25 Alex T. Magaisa, "The pitfalls of opposition politics in Zimbabwe," newzimbabwe.com, 8 August 2005 (http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/thirdforce11.12923.html), p. 2.

26 Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulous, ‘'Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism,'' Review of African Political Economy, No. 101, 2004, pp. 385-400.

27 The Herald, quoted in Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulous, ‘'Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism,'' Review of African Political Economy, No. 101, 2004, p. 387.

30 Weizmann Hamilton, ‘'Cling to Power in Zimbabwe,'' Socialism Today: the monthly journal of the Socialist Party, Issue 63, March 2002, p. 2.

31 Morgan Tsvangirai, quoted in Patrick Bond, ‘'Can NEPAD Survive its Proponents, Sponsors, Clients and Peers?'' OSSREA Newsletter, Vol. XX1, No. 3, October 2003, p. 14.

33 Hevina S. Dashwood, ‘'The Relevance of Class to the Evolution of Zimbabwe's Development Strategy,'' Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 127-48.

34 Cheryl Hendricks and Elias Mandala, ‘'Beggars Can't be Choosers: Reflections on the Zimbabwe Quagmire,'' CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos. 1 and 2, 2002, pp. 9-11.

35 Okwudiba Nnoli, Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State, 1961 to 1971 (Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1978), p. 7.

39 Sam Moyo, ‘'Policy Dialogue, Improved Governance, and the New Partnerships: Experiences from Southern Africa,'' in Hennock Kifle, Adebayo Olukoshi and Lennart Wohlgemuth (editors), A New Partnership for African Development: Issues and Parameters (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), p. 61.

40 Godfrey Kanyenze, quoted in Charles Rukuni, ‘'Tsvangirai still all the MDC has got,'' Financial Gazette (Harare), 31 May 2005, p. 2, and Godfrey Kanyenze, quoted in Charles Rukuni, ‘'Tsvangirai still all the MDC has got,'' The Insider (Harare), 31 May 2005, p. 2.

41 Sehlare Makgetlaneng, ‘'Challenges and Solution in the Struggle for Independent African Foreign Policies,'' in Louis Serapiao, Sehlare Makgetlaneng, V.S. Sheth, Francis Makoa, Moses Ralinala, Christopher Saunders and Wilfred Ndongko, African Foreign Policies in the 21st Century (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001), p. 14.

42 Jonathan N. Moyo, ‘'African Renaissance: A Critical Assessment,'' Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly, Vol. 11, No. 7 (May 1998), p. 11.

43 Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘'On the Threshold of Another False Start? A Critical Evaluation of Pro-Democracy Movements in Africa,'' in E. Ike Udogo (editor), Democracy and Democratization in Africa: Toward the 21st Century (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), p. 127.

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